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How does China's  approach  to reform-  incrementally  remov-
ing constraints  on market  behavior-  square  with the opposing
"big bang" thesis that  partial reforrn  is probably worse than  no
reforrn  because  it leaves  economic  agents  constrained  neither  by
plan nor by markets? Are there rational  bases  for these widely
different approaches  to fundamental  economic  change? If so,
what is transferable  from China?
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Gelb, Jefferson,  and Singh try to answer  impor-  * A "big bang" is not economically  necessary
tant questions:  How important  is the phasing  of  unless  justified by the need to address  macroeco-
political  and economic  liberalization  and the  nomic imbalarnces.
active  (versus  passive)  role of the state in
reform?  What  lessons  can be learned about  * Theie may be virtue in a decentralized,
comprehensive  top-down  reform  as opposed  to  "bottom-up"  approach  to reform.
experimental  bottom-up  reforms?  About  fast
versus  slow  liberalization  and opening  up of the  * Rapid privatization  is not necessary  for
economy?  About  the need to establish  full  successful  reform,  but it is irnportant  to diversify
private  property  rights at the beginning  of  ownership  and encourage  the entry of new firms.
reform?  About  reform's implications  for welfare
and distribution?  Can China's excellent  perfor-  *  Small-scale  privatization  and the liberaliza-
mance be linked to particular  reform  measures,  tion of distribution  and service sectors  are likely
or does it reflect  distinctive  initial conditions  or  to have the fastest  payoff in the reform  of
social  and demographic  factors?  Is China's  property  rights.
performance  sustainable  without  more  compre-
hensive  transformation,  or does it reflect  tran-  * China's rapid growth  momentum  and
sicnt gains that are substantially  exhausted?  macroeconomic  stability  cannot be sustained
Among  lessons  China  offers are the following:  without  further  reforns, including  the reform  of
banking,  taxation,  and property  rights.
- Partial reform  can succeed  in raising  pro-
ductivity  in agriculture  and industry;  industrial
productivity  has grown  very rapidly  in the
nonstate  sector  but also in state  enterprises.
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I. SOME IMPORTANI  OUESTIONS  RAISED BY CHINA'S REFORMS
Reform  of a communist  economy  entails shifting away from central planning  towards largely
tnarket-based  resource allocation. It also involves  strengthening  incentives  that link material reward
to euonomic  performance  by moving  toward private ownership  and reforming  management  incentives
within systems that maintain  extensive  social ownership. Reform may also involve a political
transition to pluralism but not necessarily.
Since 1978 China has progressively  introduced  market forces, decentralized  economic
decisionniaking  and strengthened  material incentives  and competition. In almost all respects its
transformation  has differed from the swift, comprehensive  and fundamental  pattern that has been
widely  advocated  for Easterm  Europe (EE) and the former Sovie. Union (Fo.  . China's reforms have
often been introduced  on an experimental  basis, and are sectorally  and locally  differentiated. They
are still incomplete  - in redefining  property rights, marketization,  liberalizing  foreign transactions  and
factor markets. Rather than attempting  to "cross a chasm in one leap", China has negotiated  a series
of small steps, moving from planned towards market socialism while retaining  an authoritarian
communist  government.
The outcome of China's reforms has also been very different from the experience  of Eastern
Europe and the FSU.  Rather than the lackluster  performance  of European reform socialism  through
the 1980s  or the precipitous  fall in output which accompanied  radical reform programs after 1990,
China doubled  per capita income in one decade, an outstanding  achievement  even when compared
1  The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily  those of thd
World Bank.  We are indebted  to Dilip Ratha for excellent  assistance  and to Stanley  Fischer, Dilip
Ratha, Tom Rawski, Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel  and Martin Schrenk for helpful  comments. All
shortcomings  of the paper are the responsibility  of the authors.2
with other high-performing  countries. 2 How does this"East Asian" response  to incrementally
removing constraints  on market behavior  square with the opposing "big bang" thesis that partial
reform is probably  worse tian no reform, because it leaves economic  agents  constrained  neither by
plan nor by maricets? Is transition economics  schizophrenic? 3 Or are there rational bases for such
widely differing views? If so, what is transferable  from China?
China's reform experien^e  therefore raises some important  questions.  What does it suggest
regarding:
i)  fast versus slow liberalization  and opening up of the economy;
ii)  comprehensive  top-down  versus experimental  bottom-up  reforms;
iii)  the need to establish full private property rights at the beginning  of reform;
iv)  the implications  of reforms for welfare and distribution?
v)  Is China's performance  sustainable  without  more comprehen.ive  transformation? Or does it
reflect transient gains that are substantially  exhausted?
vi)  How transferable  are any lessons from China -- and what does it suggest  about the phasing of
political and economic  liberalization  and the pattern of reform?
This paper surveys China's reforms and their economic  impact  against  the backdrop  of the
wider debate on these topics.  Section  II classifies  China's reforms by period and by tyre of reform.
Section.  III assesses China's macroeconomic  and social indicators  of performance  in an international
context, ,;ith selected  East Asian market countries and socialist countries  taken as benchmarks  to see
where China's performance  stands out as exceptional. It also notes the possible importance  of
demographic  factors in performance. Section  IV deepens  the analysis  of extensive  versus intensive
growth (accumulation  versus productivity), summarizing  quantitative  evidence  from recent firm-level
studies and evaluating  the changing  incentive  structures in the Chinese  economy  that would be needed
to link policies to performance. Sec.ion  V summarizes  recent research on the relationship  between
2  For some comparisons,  see World Bank (1991)  pp. 11-12.
'  Singh (1991) discusses  schizophrenia  in the context of socialist reform.3
reforms, income  distribution  and poverty in China. Section VI considers  the implications  of partial
reforms for macroeconomic  stability  and the sustainability  of China's economic  performance.
Section  VII conclt'des  on lessons  from China and their transferability  to other reforming socialist
countries.
Data Caveat.  Unlike the historic.A  data for some other communist  countries, Chinese  output
estimates  are believed  to be geneially free from del'berate over-reporting. But statistical weaknesses
introduce  biases in reported income and output levels and possibly in derived rates of growth.
Corrections  plausibly  result in much higher nominal and real output and income  levels and they also
affect estimates  of income distribution. The direction of bias is not always clear.  This paper cannot
attempt  to correct for such weaknesses  but, where appropriate, it notes the implications  of major
revisions.'
H. CHINA'S  REFYORMS  AFTER  1978
China's reforms followed  almost three decades of cential planning  under a comnmunist
government. In that time, the economy  had evolved  from an essentially  peasant base to include
significant  industrial  capacity, largely financed  out of the rural surplus. By 19',  land reform had
been completed;  in 1953  compulsory  grain procurement  and food rationing were introduced.
Collectivization  followed  in 1956-58. By 1978 industry accounted  for 49% of national  income.
Following  the Soviet  pattern, large state enterprises (SOEs) (78% of output) in heavy sectors (57% of
output) were emphasized. Growth was extensive, and particularly  disappointing  in agriculture.
Moreover, such leftist excesses as the Great Leap Forward (1958-61)  and the Cultural Revolution
(1965-68)  caused erratic economic  performance  and demographic  changes; see Figure 1.
I  Problem  areas in Chinese  data include low imputed rents and capital incomes, the valuation  of
self-consumption,  the construction  of deflators, especially  in some area of industry, and the
agricultural  labor force.  For discussion  of the major controversy  regarding  the level and growth rates
of China's GDP see Keidel (1992), Ma and Garnaut (1992)  and Jefferson (1991). The latter notes
that the World Bank' World Development  Reports estimate China's GNP per head at $350 at the end
of the 1980s,  which is LOWER  than the estimates  of $410 and $390 in 1976  and 1977 (made in 1978
and 1979)  despite real growth rates of output per head of almost 8% in the 1978-88. Keidel suggests
a revaluation  of 50% to China's yuan GDP; meanwhile,  PPP estimates  of China's income/head  range
from three to eight times those of exchange-rate  based measures.4
Neverthelss, the pre-reform period achieved  some notable successes. Infrastructure  had been
developed,  particularly in rural areas.  A working rural management  system supportizig  supply and
marketing  had been put in place.  The substantial  role played by local governments  in planning meant
that local implementation  capacity was well-developed  and also implied  a less monopolistic  production
structur.. '  There was a heavy industrial  base on which to build.  Social indicators in areas such as
health aad education  were favorable, especially  considering  the low level of income per head.
Following  an extraordinary  demographic  transition in the 1970s  (see Figure 1), China was on the way
to having one of the lowest ratio of dependents  to working-age  citizens in the world. 6 External
macroeconomic  balance  prevailed (international  reserves of $4 billion exceeded  the negligible  foreign
debt) and, despite price controls it does not appear that a sizeable  monetary  overhang had developed.
The missing elements  were an appropriate  price structure to guide efficient resource allocation  and an
effective incentive  system to create strong growth ptvrformance.
China's reforms can be considered  in seven categories  and four time phases, as in Table 1.
The first three categozies  -pice  and market reform,  the "open door policy" and liberalization  of the
distribution system, involve  tl e creation of a market price-guided  incentive  system to supplement  and
replace  planned allocation  of goods. The next category involves  changes  in property rights, broadly
defined to include  the management,  as well as ownership,  of assets.  Acc )mpanying  these reforms are
measures  to decentralize  resource allocation  away from the center, and to create a market-supporting
financial sector. Finally, the shift from a planned  tc a market economy  involves  policy changes  to
separate out the productive  side of the economy  (which should respond to market forces) from the
state's role in the area of social protection.
No grand scheme underlay China's sequence  of measures. Some were experimental,
sanctioned  by the center only after successful  local implementation. Ai0ough the rural reforms had
I  This probably facilitated  a competitive  response  to price liberalization  relative to die situation,
for example, in the FSUT For more discussion  of China's initial conditions,  see Harrold (1992).
6  For discussion  of China's demographics  and policies see Tien et al (1992).5
somewhat  of a "big bang" character, urban and industrial  reforms were ,.adual and piecemeal. 7
The discrete reform stages are therefore necessarily  somewhat  of an abstraction.
Phase l: 1-83.  This emphasized  agricultu.e.  Procurement  prices for major crops were
raised sharply ani prices for above-quota  output raised more sharply still.  Subs.dies  were increased
to help cushion the impact on consumers. The contracting  of land and output quotas to rural
households  proceeded  rapidly on local initiative;  by the time this "bottom  up" experiment  was
officially  sanctione( in 1981, it had been adopted  by almost half of the country's production  teams.
Household  contracting  soon became  universal and lease terms lengthened,  promoting long-term
investments.
llhe first industrial reforms carne in the area of foreign investment. 1979 saw a Joint Venture
Law and 1980  the openiing  of four special economic  zones.  From almost zero, foreign direct
investment  would rise to exceed $3 billion ner year, mostly  frorn Hong Kong.  Phase I also saw the
start of v ;de ranging  changes in the distribution  systems that proceeded  throughout  the reform period.
Materials supply was progressively  delinked from the plan, while retail commerce was deregulated
more rapidly.  After some informal sales of above-quota  industrial  goods at premium  L  :ices, state
enterprises were allowed to buy and sell on free markets. Meanwhile,  certain key inputs remained
controlled, particularly  in rural areas.
P'iase II: 1984-88. This saw the consolidation  of a formal dual pricing system and the
progressive  enlargement  of the role of free prices: see Figure 2.  The dual pricing system aimed to
have marginal  decisions  set by market pressures while still leavith;  a measure  of control over
materials and enterprise  profitability to the plan.  By i988 only 30% of retail sales were made at plan
prices.'  Market  prices exceeded  plan prices by a premiu 1 l which rose steadily up to 42% as
I  The rural reforms still relied on quotas and state prices for intramarginal  production  and
management  incentives  through contracting  and leasing, rather than outright private ownership. In
this sense, they were piecemeal  and somewhat  less than a "big bang".
I  The share of sales at nonplan  prices ;nciudes  i7%  d& guidance' prices which generally movec
with free prices.6
maicroeconomic  dem.and  pressures intensified  in the course of decentralization.' By 1985  75  % of
state comznercial  companies  had been sold or leased  to prisqte owners; by 1990  hordes of private and
cooperative  firms, aw  well as joint ventures, had entered the commercial  system.  ..t the s&ne time,
the yuan was devalued and a variety of other measures  was introduced  with the intention  of opening
up international  trade to market forces on a limited basis.
Phase ZI  saw two important  reforms in the area of industrial  property rights.  Rural Township
and Village Enterprises  (TVEs) actually had their roins in earlier progra.r  of rura' industrialization,
but in 1984  local governments  were given permission  to pursue a TVE-ba:ed development  strategy to
help absorb labor released by the agricultural  reforms.  Together with &rowth  of urban collectives,  the
explosion  of TVE activity resulted in progressive  diversification  of industriai  ownership  away from
the SOEs in favor of the so-called "nonstate"  sector, although  most of this was still within  the public
domain: see Figure 3,10
The second major industrial  reform in Phase II was the adoptioni  after 1987 of the contract
management  responsibility  system.  Performance  contracts with ;nterprise managers specified  profit
remittance,  productivity  and sometimes  innovation  targets.  'To increase  the range of management
discretion, a!l new workers after 1986 were to 'e hired on a contract system, thus raising, at least
theoretically,  the possibil,ty  of dismissal.
Decentralizing  management  and progressively  introducing  market forces made little sense,
however, in an environment  where all industrial  profits were remitted  tJ  the state.  Phase II therefore
saw an important  series of reforms to decentralize  resource alloca.ion  away from government. These
included reform of enterprise taxation  in 1984-85,  which replaced  remittances  by negotiated  profits
taxes. In 1986, central governmeijt  entered into a "fiscal  contract responsibility  system" with local
governments,  which had in fact long been responsible  for the collection  of almost all taxes.  As
I  Zou (1992) traces out the evolution  of the duai pricing system using a sample  of 253 state firms
and urban collectives;  the latter sold and purchased  a higher share of goods at market prices than the
former.
10 Only about 10% of China's industry is individually  owned or.joint-venture. The bulk of the
"nonstate"  sector consists of urban collectives  and firms owned by local governments. The concepts
of ownership and property,  rights are not well developed in China's legal code.7
discussed  later, resource  decentralization  was more effective than txpectcdl.  qnd this led to a sharp
drop in revenies and overheating  of the eccnomy.
Finally, initial steps were taken in Phase II to lay the basis for a commercial  financial
system but this was iihnit-d  by the puartial  nature of other reforms, in particular, if  ownership.
Further development,  this time of stock markets on a limited bas3s,  dia not take place urntil  some
years later.
Ehact  III: 1989290. Macroecnnomic  stabilization  and the political crackdown  following
Tiananmen  Square involved  the temporary reimposition  of a range of direct centrols.  Plan prices
began to be adjusted towards market levels Go  as to start to merge the two price systems into ona (see
Figure 2).
Phase III a'so saw the acceleration  of .rade and payments  reform.  Progressive  devaluations  in
iThas  s, I and 11  had depreciated  the real exchange  rate relative to the dollar by over 50%: see Figure
4.  As domestic  demand was reined in, exports responded. Foreign exchange  trading centers were
opened, and the black market premium fell, to a minimum  of only 7% in 1991. By then, about one
third of international  transactions  were takin.g  place at the parallel market rate.
Phase IV: 1991  onwards. marked a return to active reforms with further marketization
(including  growth of final markets) and decentralization. There was also significant  reduction in
redundant  labor in the state sector and some privatization  of state enterprises. Growth picked up,
with some signs of overheating. Social-sector  reforms began in areas such as health a..  housing,
though on a cautious and experimental  basis.
Comparison  with Reforms in EE and the FSIJ.  Space  does not permit a detailed comparison
of China's reform process with those of EE and the FS'l."'  Considering  rre-l190 Poland and
Hungary, there ar  ;ndecd similarities  but also some important  differences. C;iina's opening-up  to
trade and foreign investment,  its massive  de-collectivization  of agricultur..,  liberalization  of the
I  Fischer and Gelb (1991) and Gelb and Gray (1991) consider  the phasing  of European-style
transtormation  programs.  Bruno (1992) reviews stabilization  programs.8
distribution system and growth of nonstate  industry iv 'olved a far stronger commnitment  to
narketizatio.i and domestic competition. On the other hand, it maintained  central planning  and a
distinctive  two-price system.
The most cbvious differences between  China's policies and those of East European countries
aflter 199  include the partial nature of its price and trade liberalization,  its incomplete  reform of
property rights, and the quite different  phasing of macroeconomric  stabilization  and structural reforms.
The initial core of most EE reform programs involved  macrostabilizatinn  which was partly effected
through the liberalization  of prices and markets. In Ch-na, however, the need for a stabilization
phase (which during 1988-91  involved some regression from liberalization)  follow  from the
implementation  of its sistemic reform program." 2 China's price and trade liberalizatior.  also
coirncided  with, rather than preceded, ownership  diversification  and liber0lizdion  of the distribution
system.  - 3
III.  CHINA'S  PERFORMAi '.E  IN A COMPARATIVE CONTEXT
Tables 2 and 3 show selected economic  and social data for China and (i) India, similarly
large, and low-income,  but with a (regulated)  market economy  and a democratic  polity; (ii) Korea,
Tqdonesia,  Thailand  and the province  of Taiwan, considered  as high-performing  East Asian market
economies;  and (iii) Hungary, Poland, Soviet Union (FSU) and Yugoslavia,  which developed  under
central planning and one party regimes and which also implemented  decentralizing  reforms.
Now rich Is China?. It has long been recognized  that exchange-rate  based (Atlas) methods  of
calculating  income per capita understate "real" levels for many countries.  From Table 2, the
divergence  between these two measures  is especially  large for China, which appears  by the 1980s ?s
12  The closest analog in Europe and the FSU is the phase of fiscal distress that has followed  the
post-reform  collapse of enterprise profits and tax revenues. See, for example, Schaffer  (1992).
13  By 1985, when the share of state-fixed  prices in retail sales had fallen to 50%, state enterprises
produced  less than 40% of goods sold on retail markets and nonstate industry  produced almost 40%
of industrial  output.  Some of this was due to the pre-reform structure of China's economy, but it also
reflected progressive ownership  (iiversification  oefore  that date.9
more a middle-income,  than a poor, country, and to have outstripped  India in PPP terms. This
perspective  should be born in mind when comparing social statistics.
H}ow  fast has China grown?  In contrast to the dismal 1960s, China  boosted its growth rate
dramatically  in the 1970s  and 1980s,  to iO% in the latter period, eclipsing  India's efforts and
matching  the performance  of the East Asian comparators. The socialist comparators  stagnated  before
experiencing  a sharp output loss after 1989.  Population  growth slowed in China as in East Asia, to
well below Indian levels but still far above rates in the socialist  comparators.' 4
Did growth reflect accumulation  or efficiency? Table 2 shows investment  rates and rough
derived efficiency  measures (the inverse  of the incremental  capital/output  ratio).  China appears as a
high-investment  country which boosted its efficiency  from low levels to those characteristic  of East
Asia.  The contrast with India, and with the collapse of efficiency in the socialist  comparators, is
marked.  China's investment  was overwhelmingly  financed through domestic  savings: by the 1990s  its
net foreign debt was only 3% of GDP compared with  2% for India and 53% for socialist
comparators.
China's investment  rates are,  probably biased upwards, however, by gross understatement  of
GDP levels.  Applying  a uniform  level correction  based on Keidel(1992)  lowers them by almost one
third.  The effect would be to boost efficiency,  to well above the East Asian comparator  levels in the
reform period.
How fast has China opened its economy?  As shown, China's export growth rates in the
1980s  compare with those of the East Asian countries  in the 1960s  and 1970s. Its trade ratio, too,
has risen sharply, especially  for so large a country, but it is difficult  to assess its openness  from
trade/(;DP measures  because of the uncertainty  of the denominator." 5
14  China's PPP growth rates are close to those of its Atlas GNP per head; for the other countries
PPP income per head grows rather more slowly than Atlas income per head.
'5 China's ratio of exports plus imports  to GDP rose from 7% in the 1960s  to 21% by the 1980s
and 33% in the 90s.  Of perhaps more importance  than this ratio, China's export mix also diversified
and moved  towards more sophisticated  products.  In contrast, the European countries, locked in the
CMEA system, experierced "technical  export regression  towards primary products.  See Gelb and10
How fast  asc  China monetized?  China's low inflation  during the 60's and 70's was due to
price controls but it also contained  inflation  to East Asian levels through the period of price
liberalization  - a marked contrast to European reform socialist  experience.' 6 From the Table,
financial  deepening  proceeded  apace in China  through the reforms, even as most prices were
liberalized. There was therefore probably no appreciable  "monetary  overhang"  at the start of the
reforms.  The range of assets available to the population, while widening  somewhat,  is still limitel,
and this may also have encouraged  financial  asset  accumulation  as incomes  rose.
Do social indicators confirm  that there has been rapid development  in China?.  Whatever  the
controversies  surrounding  output data, it is harder to dispute  the many social indicators  that measure
improvements  in the quality of life.  From Table 3, life expectancy  has risen and infant mortality
fallen to levels characteristic  of far richer countries. The extraordinarily  rapid decline in birth rates
shown in Figure 1 has reduced the age dependency  ratio sharply."  The decline  in birth rates is
related to other factors, including  female  labor force participation  and education  (especially  of
women).  Female participation  in the labor force has always  been high in China, and it has largely
closed the gender education  gap, completely  at primary levels.
Do social policies account for economic  success? Most of China's favorable  social indicators
primarily reflect policies in the pre-reform  period, and an interesting  question  is the extent to which
these have contributed  to post-reform  economic  performance.  In addition  to the broad issue of the
importance  of human capital formation  for growth, one may wonder about  the impact  of sharp
demographic  transition on growth.  This is a controversial  topic beyond the scope of this paper.  In
contrast with previous analyses,  some recent studies in the 1980s  do suggest the emergence  of a
negative relationship  between  population  and GDP growth rates. There is at least one study, due to
Barlow (1992)  that suggests  that a sudden reduction in fertility rates raises output  growth considerably
Gray (1991) Annex 1.
16  Schmidt-Hebbel  (1992)  considers the relationship  between money  overhang, price liberalization
and inflation in China and other socialist countries. China's financialization  ratios, like the trade and
investment  ratios, may be biased upwards  by the understatement  of yuan GDP.
7  However, the age dependency  rate will increase sharply with the ageing of the population, to
one of the highest  levels in the world as the ageing  population  profile comes  to resemble  that of Japan
and Korea.11
over the next twelve years.  Extrapolating  his results to China would suggest a remarkably  large
impact  of the fertility declines of the 1970s  on China's growth in the 1980s. Barlow's results seem
extreme  and are certainly not uncontested. But even if greatly discounted,  they suggest the possible
explanatory  power of China's demographic  transition  of the 1970s in boosting an otherwise  sound
economic  response  to systemic  reforms to stellar proportions  in the 1980s. 11
A Summing  Up.  Precise  judgments on China's income level and economic  characteristics
confront  data problems, but its economic  performance  in the reform period resembles  that of the
dynamic East Asian comparators.  In social dimensions,  China is a real outlier, suggesting  the
success  of its basic needs strategy. The contribution  of the social dimen3ion  to growth over the last
15 years is difficult to assess, but may be considerable.
IV.  INTENSIVE VERSUS EXTENSIVE FACTORS IN CHINA'S  PERFORMANCE
The growth accounting  exercise in Table 4 shows that growth and its sources have varied
significantly  by subperiod in China. Factor accumulation  has accounted  for most growth, but
beginning  with Phase I of the reforms in the late 1970s  and continuing  through Phase II, TFP rose at
2.8-3.8 percent.  The phase of macroeconon.ic  stabilization  in Phase III caused a sharp reduction in
growth during 1989-91  which in turn led to stagnant  or even declining  residual  productivity. In 1992
growth rates ihave  returned to their pre-1989 double-digit  levels.
Table 5 shows the large structural change in sectoral shares of Gross Social Product (GSP) and
also, within industry by ownersnip type, that accompanied  reform.  After falling as China
industrialized,  agriculture's share of GSP rose through Phase I and declined thereafter.  Meanwhile,
industrial  ownership  diversified  considerably.
11 For reviews of this area see Srinivasan  (1992), Blanchet  (1992), Kelley and Schmidt(1992),
and references  cited therein.  Barlow (1992) suggests  that a sudden  reduction of fertility causing  a
permanent  reduction  of about one percentage  point in the annual net birth rate will cause  output to be
higher by 21 % at the end of 12 years.  By this standard, China's decline  in fertility would have
aceounted  for an increase in -eal output of 42% at the end of 12 years!  Barlow's coefficients  seem
unreasonably  high - for one thing, there is insufficient  cross-country  evidence  of the large response in
intermediate  variables, such as savings and female  participation  rates, t.at would be needed to
produce  so large a growth response  to the demographic  transition:  for more discussion, see Kelley
and Schmidt  (1992).12
Productivity  growth has varied significantly  across sectors as well as over time: Table 6
summarizes  various resf.Jts. TFP growth in agriculture  appears  to have soared from negative  levels to
account for much of the vapid  growth after 1978. According  to Lin et al (1993) almost half of the
42.2 percent growth of output in the cropping  sector in 1978-84  was driven by productivity  change
due to reforms.  Specifically,  almost all of the productivity  growth was attributable  to the changes
resulting from the introduction  of the household  responsibility  system." 9 TFP measures  for
agriculture  as a whole are not available for the most recent period but if we assume that labor
pr'ductivity growth is somewhat  higher than TFP growth the 3 percent rate of labor productivity
growth during 1984-88  implies  that TFP declined  relative to 1978-84  but remained well above its pre-
reform levels.'
Chen et al (1988) find that from 1978-85,  TFP in state industry (SOE  at 5.2 percent,
far above  the estimated level of about one percent in the previous two decades.  !efl-rson, Rawski
and Zheng (JRZ, 1992)  investigate  TFP growth with capital, labor and intermediate  innuts: during
1980-88  their single factor productivity  rose at rates of 2.1, 5.2 and 2.1 percent respectively. A
measure of TFP growth formed by any linear combination  of these rates would yield a composite  rate
of productivity  growth somewhere  within  this range. They estimate TFP growth of 2.40 percent in
1980-88, 1.80 percent during 1980-84  and 3.01 percent during 1984-88.
Using the same procedures  JRZ (1992) estimate  TFP growth for the collective  industry (urban
collectives  and TVEs established  at or above the township  level) at 4.63 percent for the period 1980-
88.  For the subperiods, collective  sector TFP rose at rates of 3.45 dur,ng 1980-84  and 5.86 during
1984-88.
These data sbow a consistent  pattern of higher productivity  growth during the reform period.
While TFP in non-state industry  rose more rapidly than in the SOEs, productivity  in state industry
19 McMillan  et al (1989) estimate that three-quarter  of the measured productivity  increase was
due to changes  in the incentive  system associated  with the household responsibility  system and the
remainder  to price increases.
I  Rawski suggests,  however, that agricuirurai  iabor force may nave been systematically
overestimated  in recent years.  If so, TFP may have continued  at higher rates.13
rose at rates that had been unachieved  since the early 1950s. 21 There are biases in these figures,'
but these are unlikely to overturn these broad conclusions.
Productivity  Levels by Ownership  Type  Table 7, based on the JRZ calculations  shows that,
while TFP in China's TVEs and SOEs was approximately  equal in 1980, by 1988 the TVE sector had
achieved  a clear productivity  level margin over the state-owned  enterprises. Preliminary  results from
disaggregated  analysis  show a somewhat  more mixed picture however.'
In order to give some perspective  to the productivity  growth performance  of Chinese industry,
Table 8 summarizes  estimates  of TFP from various sourcas. Prior to the reforms, Chinese  industrial
TFP growth compared with that of Turkey, Yugoslavia  and India during the 1960s  and 1970s,  but
after reforms it accelerated  to a range comparable  to that of East Asian NICs during the 1960s.
21  These results for state industry are consistent  with Beck  and Bohnet (undated),  Zou (1992),
based on a sample  of 254 enterprises, and other studies which properly deflate  the capital stock and
remove non-production  inputs of capital and labor.
I  Output deflators are biased downward  thus leading  to excessively  high reports of industrial
output growth.  In the state sector, the principal source of this bias in the 1980s  was product
innovation. When a new product is introduced, as ter other pre *icts,  enterprises are expected  to
report industrial  output in both current and 1980  prices.  As a .iiatter of practice (and because  there
may be no comparable  product with a known i980 price) they often used the price posted at the time
the product was introduced in lieu of the 1980  price.  This introduces  systematic  bias into measures  of
GVIO in 1980  prices, particularly in industries  within which new product innovation  is widespread.
Jefferson (1991) suggests  that these biases may run from virtually  zero in industries  in which there is
little product innovation, such as oil and gas production  to as high at 7.8 percent in the electrical
machinery  industry where during 1980-85,  thre  annual rate of growth was reported to be 25 percent.
Overall, he estimates  upward bias from spurious  accounting  procedures associated  with new product
innovation  to be in the vicinity of one percent.  Rawski (1992a) discusses  bias in the output  deflators
available  for the collective  sector.  They may equal or even exceed that for state industry, but do not
change the qualitative  finding of rapid productivity  growth within  that sector.
13 A comparison  of levels and rates of growth of TFP in SOEs and TVEs in seven two-digit
enterprises  shows TVE productivity  in 1989  ;o be higher in construction  materials.,  metal  products and
machinery,  but iower in food, textiles, paperrnakmg  and home appliances  (Jefferson, !993).  The
growth of TFP among  the TVEs was higher i5 ail seven branches.14
Reforms and  Efficiency: More Evidence. A number of studies using enterprise-level  data
have examined  patterns of changing  resource allocation  and efficiency  within China's industry in ways
that help assess the impact of reforms. 24
(i)  Studies tend to show evidence  of gains in allocative  efficiency  that are compatible  with
the spread of broad market forces.  Naughton (1992)  shows convergence  of profit rates across 38
industrial  branches, with the coefficient  of variation  declining  from 0.78 in 1980  to 0.44 in 1989. In
a similar vein, Jefferson and Xu (forthcoming)  evaluate  gains in allocative  efficiency  among 226 large
and medium-size  SOEs at the core of the state system.  Over the period 1980-89,  among  enterprises
within the same industrial branches  and enterprises  operating under similar pricing regimes  they find
patterns of convergence  of average productivities  for capital and labor and, to a lesser extent, for
materials. Convergence  is most rapid and complete  among  enterprises that operate fully outside  the
plan.
(ii)  Jefferson and Xu (1992) investigate  patterns of convergence  among  measures of total
factor productivity  (technical  efficiency). During 1980-89,  enterprises within 8 of 10 industries
demonstrate  a tendency for TFP to converge. Results by Xiao (1990) using a sample of 903 SOEs
and other research on steel plants also show tendencies  for TFP to become more equal.  There also
seems to be a link between  exposure to market forces and TFP growth.  As with gains in allocative
efficiency,  gains in technical  efficiency  are most pronounced  among enterprises  operating outside  the
plan in Jefferson and Xu (1992). Zou (1992) found that ownership  by itself provided  a statistically
significant  explanation  of differences in TFP.  But, when a carefully constructed  measure  of degree of
marketization  (including  the market share of sales and material purchases and price spreads) is added,
Zou found that this degree of marketization  was a more powerful explanation  of TFP growth than was
ownership type.
(iii)  There also appears  to have been increasing  innovation  in China's enterprises. A
survey of 250 enterprises by Jefferson, Rawski and Zheng(1992)  found evidence  of increasing  rates of
I  In addition  to these studies we note that most studies find evidence  of increasing  returns to
scale at the enterprise level, and since the number of SOEs grew at only 0.9% in 1980-89,  average
gross output  per enterprise in 1980  prices rose at 9.8%.15
innovation. Over 90% of the leading innovators  were considered  (by enterprises  of all types) to be in
the state sector.
Beneath  the Numbers: Relating  Performance  to Reforms. The micro-level  and regional
studies noted above indicate  that the rise in TFP growth within state industry originated  both from
gains in allocative  and technical  efficiency  and from accelerating  innovation. They are internally
consistent  and suggestive  of the ways in which such specific reforms as progressive  marketization,
diversification  of ownership  towards the nonstate sector, and the open door policy have contributed  to
improved  productivity.  However, there is not unanimity  among China scholars in this area.  Some
studies find evidence  of chaotic institutional  arrangements,  redundant  and undisciplined  labor,
interference  by supervisory  bodies, ill-defined  ownership, and bank lending with no prospect of
repayment. We do not deny that these problems  are widespread,  and that there are a number of "soft
spots" in the reform process.'  The weight of the quantitative  micro-evidence  confirms, however,
that on balance the impact of the reform process on efficiency  has been favorable.
Because  evidence  on the reasons for the boost in agricultural  productivity  seems reasonably
clear, we focus on two key questions raised by China's industrial  reform program.  (i)  How has
incremental  reform improved  the SOEs' performance  despite the less favorable impacts of such
reforms in Hungary (for over two decades) and Poland (for one decade)? And (ii) Why has the TVE
sector boomed despite not being really private? Just what kind of firms are these?  How do
incentives  work for (and against)  TVE efficiency?
(i)  The SOEs.  To understand  the way in which China's industrial  reforms have worked, it is
useful to distinguish  between  so-called "improving"  reforms and end-state reforms.  The 1980s
industrial reform program created a set of incentives  and opportunities  that shifted the SOE
institutional  efficiency  frontier outwards, closer to best practice.  Pre- and post-tax  enterprise profits
are correlated and have become more closely so (in general) as reforms have progressed. Moreover,
I  For more discussion, see, for example  Fan and Woo (1992), Stepanek(1991)  and the exceilent
reviews of Walder (1987).16
tax rates have not typically been revised ex DOS  on the basis of performance.> 2 Though bad for
fiscal revenues, this implies stronger incentives. Among SOEs the relationship  between workers'
bonuses and enterprise profitability  became  stronger during the 1980s  (Rawski, 1992b). Enterprises
for which the strongest incentive  structures  have been created and have received  the greatest
autonomy  have succeeded in motivating  the largest increases  in labor productivity  (McMillan  and
Naughton, 1992). The introduction  of incentives  has also motivated  factory managers  to raise
efficiency (Jefferson  and Xu, 1992). Groves  eL_a (1992)  argue that the reforms introduced  many of
the incentives  present in Western  managerial  labor markets, though in somewhat  different forms.  It
also appears that investment  out of retained profits yields higher growth of capital productivity  than
investment  financed by government and bank loans (Jefferson  and Xu, 1992) and that there are
increasingly  strong linz-,  between  profitability  and expansion. Jefferson and Xu (1992) find this
profit-expansion  link to be statistically  sigi'ificant  for a sample of 110 iron and steel mills, at the core
of the state system.
Although  this paper cannot go into deep comprrative detail, available  evidence  seems to
indicate  that the limited reform initiatives  taken by Hungary and Poland before 1990  did not result in
similar improvements  in incentives  and performance. Rawski (1992b)  contrasts  his findings for China
with those for Hungary (due to Kornai and Matits (1987))  which, despite years of reform socialism,
had a tax system that left little relationship  between  pre- and post-tax  profitability. Schaffer  (1990)
found a similarly  small relationship  for pre-big-bang  Poland. Estrin, Schaffer  and Singh (1992)
actually  found a perverse relationship  between increases  in profits and wages in 1989-90.
In addition, the changes in China's incentive  system are unlikely  to have had as much effect were
it not for the explosive  growth of competition  from outside  the state sector.  In contrast to pre-1990
EE, entry and competition  grew from two contrasting sources. The first was the open door policy,
comprising  trade and joint venture investment. Preliminary  analysis  by Singh, Xiao and Ratha (1993)
suggests that an "open door" dummy  for the four provinces  closest  to Hong Kong and Taiwan is a
significant  explanator  of the growth rate of gross industrial  output,  By the 1990s,  two thirds of all
26  A study of 230 enterprises  showed  that when profitability  during the first management  contract
period (typically 1987-90)  exceeded  expectations  (i e  the profit remittance  rate was lower and the
retention  rate was higher than expected),  subsequent  contracts  tended.  to validate  the lower profit
remittance  and higher retention  rates rather than simply  adjust to a new baseline.17
exports came from special enterprise zones, with the state sector accounting  for two thirds of these
and the nonstate  sector for the remainder. Ongoing research on coastal zones suggests  that the level
of foreign investment  is associated  with provincial-level  growth rates.'  The second was the rapid
entry of rural TVEs, which has eliminated  the traditional monopoly  of state enterprises  in most
branches of industry.  Both of th se sources of competition  have invigorated  state industry.
(ii)  The TVEs.  As described in Byrd and Gelb (1990), TVEs are typically  under the watchful
eye of the local Industrial Council, the business  arm of the local government, rather than being
autonomous  (see also JRZ 1992). But unlike the central government,  township  and village
governments  cannot engage directly in deficit financing, and there is no effective  system of equalizing
incomes across rural communities. These therefore face a relatively  hard budget  constraint.  Local
leaders are heavily dependent  on the revenue generated  by local industry, and revenue per resident
can differ enormously  between successful  and unsuccessful  localities. In a variety of ways, the
prestige, perks and incomes  of local officials respond to the financial  success  of their communities.
Business  competence  has become one factor in their appointment.
The result is intense  competition  among  local governments  - for industry, profits and
increasingly  for foreign partners. 28 While governments  at various levels try and favor "their"
enterprises, (for example, by trying to ensure that financial resources raised locally are recycled
within the community)  their ability to do so is constrained  by their resources.  Also, being smaller,
they have less potential scope for protecting  their industries  which operate almost entirely  on free
product markets. The fixed-membership  nature of China's communities  provides a strong natural
focus for the exercise of ownership rights, even though these are communal  rather than private."
27  Wang and Mody (1992).
28  Zweig (1992,1993)  describes  the competition  for joint ventures  between local governmnents.
29  In some circumstances  poor local governments  may become "fiscal predators"  on their
enterprises - until the base for such predation is eliminated;  see Byrd and Gelb(1990)  Communities
may also attract labor from other localities, but these are often paid less than the locals and share less
in the benefits  of 'ownership".18
The TVE sector can therefore be considered  as a quasi-private  sector in terms of its
governance, with an immobile  local community  as the shareholders  in firms operating mostly in a
market environment.A 0 The international  experience  of similar firms confirms  that such a model has
the potential  to be competitive." 1
v.  REFoQ3  :v. INCOME  DISI.  RIUTIC)N  AND PMVR1
One of the major questions about socialist  transformation  is whether  it will lead to a widening
of income differentials  and erode the strong social safety net characteristic  of communist  systems.
This section therefore provides a brief overview  of the distributional  impact of China's reforms.32
Pre-reform China was a moderately  equal society in terms of measured  income distribution.
However, it was less egalitarian  than the countries in Eastern Europe (which had some of the most
egalitarian  income distributions  in the world). 33 The evolution  of income inequality  through China's
reforms has reflected  three main developments:
1)  Urban-rural  income differentials. At the start of refotms, rural income/head
represented  only 42% of urban income/head  as conventionally  measured in China: Figure 5.  This
was a wider divergence  than in India (71  %); Thailand  (45%) and even Brazil (43  %); moreover,
weaknesses  in the measurement  of incomes, in particular  the omission of subsidies,  probably
understates  the true differential  by a considerable  margin.3'  These differentials  have persisted
because  of strict regulation  of migration  from the countryside  through the system of urban registration
and because many  benefits are tied to jobs.
30 It is not clear that communal  ownership  warrants the term "cooperative  culture" as used by
Weitzman  and Xu (1992), because  the style of government  and corporate culture may be far from
cooperative.
31 Sveinar  and Gelb (1990)  discuss various international  comparators  to Chinas  rural enterprises.
32 It does not address the question  of whether  reforms have strengthened,  or begun to erode,
health and other social indicators (see, e.g., Nolan and Sender (1992)).
3  For comparisons  of Gini coefficients,  see Gelb and Gray (1991) Annex  6.
See Zhao (1992).19
Phase I of the reform saw a considerable  narrowing of the margin as compulsory  procurement
was reduced in scope, agricultural  prices were raised and the household  responsibility  system boosted
productivity. The margin widened  again in Phase II however, as urban reforms liberalized  industrial
prices and permitted  greater growth of urban incomes. By 1990  the measured  ratio of rural to urban
incomes  had fallen back to slightly  below its pre-reform level.
Measured income is a poor proxy for total income as it excludes  so-called "nonwage"  income
and subsidy income in kind, particularly important  in the urban areas.  A special survey conducted  for
1988 suggested  that urban incomes  were higher by 54% and rural incomes  higher by 39% of their
conventionally  measured  values. The implication  is a considerably  higher Gini coefficient  for the
overall country - 0.382 for 1988  compared with the "official"  estimate  of below 0.33.'5  Further, the
rise of nonwage income relative to wage income roted in the next section suggests  that the ratio of
rural to urban incomes may be increasing  further.6
2)  Ru,al-Rural Inequality. China is a large country with highly differentiated  regional
economies. Whereas  urbaii incomes  have been very equally distributed  (Gini about 16% in 1980),
there have been no effective mechanisms  for rural income  redistribution. Income  from rural
nonagricultural  enterprises has become the main factor differentiating  rural incomes  on a communal
basis.  There is no indication  that inequality  is higher witbin the most industrially  developed rural
areas".  The evidence  on the evolution  of the rural Gini coefficient  during the Phase I of reform is
somewhat  contradictory,  with some studies showing a rise and others a fall. 38 However, the growth
of rural industry in Phase II appears to have increased  rural-rural inequality,  with the richest areas
growing faster.
35 Khan et a], 1991, p69.
36  The salary reforms of 1985 sought to further equalize  urban incomes  by constraining
differentials. One study estimated  nonwage income rising from 26% of wage income in 1985  to 35%
in 1990, a consequence  of increased enterprise autonomy  in the face of continuing  controls on state
enterprise pay levels.  Zhao (1992) estimates  that wages and bonuses may  mount to only about half
of urban incomes.
37  Zhao (1992).  Gelb (1990) also notes the tendency  towards local equality  when
surveying TVE workers.
3  See World Bank (1992b)  Chapter 2.20
3)  The Rise of the "Private" Sector.  Cash incomes  in the private sector, defined to
include self-employed,  private domestic firms, joint ventures and foreign-owned  firms are  only 15%
higher than cash incomes in the urban state sector, according  to a 1988  survey.  Distribution  is very
different in private and state sectors however, with Gini coefficients  of 0.49 and 0.23 according to the
survey.  Private incomes  at the high end of dhe  scale are probably partly due to the opportunities  to
exploit rents created from the continuance  of controls  on prices and credit, but the experience of
European and FSU socialist reform also suggests  a tendency for wide dispersion in private incomes  at
the start of reform.
Overall Inequality  and Povery.  As a result of these tendencies,  oveiall inequality  in China,
appears  to have declined  during Phase I of reform.  Since then it has increased, probably  back to its
its starting point but possibly  more."  Combining  growth and distributional  effects, the first stage of
the reform saw a massive fall in the number  of people living in absolute  poverty, from about 265
million in 1978 to 90 million in 1984, a decline from one third to less then a tenth of China's
population.'  Despite continued  high growth, increasing  dispersion of income distribution  then
caused the number to rise slightly, as shown in the Figure.  This is significant  because China has yet
to put into place a social safety net appropriate  to a market economy  and geared to the needs of a
growing "floating"  population. It may have been wise not to divert effort in this direction before
reaping the growth rewards of reform (and China was perhaps fortunate in that pie-reform
distribution  was not so egalitarian  to force the pace) but. to avoid social polarization in the longer
run, rteps in this direction, as well as liberalizing  labor movement,  will be necessary.
VI.  MACROECONOMIC STABILITY AND SUSTAINABILITY
As in EE and the FSU, the movement  from planned to market socialism  has generated
macroeconomic  pressures in China.  The policy of resource decentralization  was more effective  than
anticipated. Government  revenues dropped sharply between 1978  and 1991 and enterprise revenues
net of subsidies almost vanished: see Figure 6.  This largely resulted from a sharp decline in the
profit rate in the state enterprise sector, but it also reflected the particular inter,.ction  of ownership,
3  Gini coefficients  from 1981  to 1988  have oeen estimated  on a household  basis from SSB data.
40 World Bank (1992b), Table 1.2.21
management  aud fiscal arrangements. Local governments  were the effective  owners and regulators  of
many of the enterprises, as well as tax collectors. This produced a situation fraught with conflicts of
interest, moral hazard and collusion against  the center.  Even though central development
expenditures  were cut as investment  was decentralized,  the effect was a heavy fiscal stress mirrored in
moderate, but rising, ueficits after 1985.
Moreover, revenue and ownership  policies interacted, in the form of case-by-case  bargaining
over tax targets fixed in nominal (not real) terms.  This hsad  the unintended  consequence  of rendering
fiscal policy ineffective  as a macroeconomic  regulator. At the same tinme,  decentralization  weakened
central mone-'ry control."  China's reform process therefore resulted in demand-led
macroeconomic  shocks which impacted  on a system with limited indexation;  Figure 7 shows the
close relationship  between inflation  and changes  in industrial output symptomatic  of such a demand-
pull relationship.
Declining SOE profits and rising losses reflected  several factors.  In 1991 36 percent of the
losses were concentrated  in extractive industries  w1iose  prices were controlled  at below-market  levels.
Industrial profits have also felt the effect of contractionary  policies initiated  after 1989. A third factor
is the erosion of the state's production  monopoly  and generally  growing competition  (see Naughton
(1992), Chen, Jefferson and Singh (1992) and Singh, Xiao and Ratha (1993)). This has led to a
decline in the supraprofits  of state industry (previously  used to concentrate  surplus in the state sector)
as well as in the TVE sector, where the entry of hundreds of thousands  of new rural producers drove
pre-tax profit rates down from 40 percent in 1978  to about 13 percent in 1990.  In further support of
the competition  hypothesis  Singh and Xiao (1993) use data from 28 provinces  to show that the more
rapid the growth of non-state  industry during 1985-90,  the lower the profit rate of state industry in
1990.
A fourth, less benign, factor may have been the consequence  of increasing  SOE autonomy in
the face of unclear ownership, leading to owner retained  earnings enterprise decapitalization,  falling
profits, distress borrowing and macroeconomic  pressure.  Fan and Woo (1992) note problematic
41 For discussions  of China's monetary  and fiscai controi methods  and their shortcomings  see
B'ejer (1992), Schmidt-Hebbel  (!991), Fan and Woo (1992), Chen etal  (199 2).22
symptoms  at the enterprise level very similar to those so destabilizing  in the reform socialist pl 3e in
EE and the FSU: a rise in wage payments  (and especially  in fl inge benefits) relative  to output, a
"hunger" for resources, and increasing  recourse  to borrowing  by enterprises  at the expense  of retained
earnings.42
So far, the growth and pronounced  financial  deepening  of China's economy  has permitted
credit to expand rapidly in real terms.  To an extent difficult  to determine, this has, so far, cushioned
losses in the enterprise sector. 43 How China deepens  reforms in response to the weakened  financial
position  of the SOEs will play a critical role in determining  whether macro-destabilization  can be
avoided, and the favorable macro environment  for growth sustained. China's financial  deepening  will
not continue indefinitely. However, for three reasons, the situation is more favorable than in EE and
the FSU.  First,  Chinese authorities  have again begun actively  to implement  reform within  the
industrial  sector. These, indeed, appear to signal a change of attitude towards  enterprise closures and
property r.  hts issues.'  Second, the rapid growth of China's economy  raises its capacity to absorb
losses. Third, with the share of state industry  now accounting  for less than one half of industrial
42  For a 300 enterprise sample of SOEs studied by Fan and Woo(1992),  nonproductive  assets
rose from 18% of productive  assets in 1984  to 24% in 1988  and nonproduction  expenditure  rose over
twice as fast as production  costs.  See also Xiao(1990).
43  McKinnon  (1993)  cites estimates  of the consolidated  government  (and enterprise) deficit that
are in the range of 8% of GDP.
"  Prices have been further liberalized. Layoffs  have been enforced in a number of industries.
The state has begun an active program of restructuring  the coal industry, scheduling  the reductions  of
100,000  workers in each year during 1992-1995. This year, 30 mines are scheduled  to be closed
(New York Times, December 29, 1992, p. Dl).  Also, ownership  reform is again on the agenda: see
Harrold (1993).  in practice, many enterprises are selling shares to employees, residents  within the
enterprise locality, or on the Shenzhen,  Shanghai  or renegade.  stock markets. More significantly,
there are powerful incentives  to bring private capital into the state sector.  Strapped  for revenue, local
governments  are selling participation  in many smaller state enterprises for which they are responsible.
Perhaps the most visible example  was the recent sale by tne Quanzhou  City government (Fujian)  of a
60 percent controlling  interest in 40 of the City's 41 state factories to a Hong Kong company. (Wall
Street Journal, January 14, 1993, p. A  12). Moreover, because  joint ventures operate under favorable
arrangements  with respect to taxcs, flexibie  :abor-management  relations, etc., in order to secure these
advantages,  many enterprises are actively seeking  foreign partners.23
output and talling strwadily,  with growth ever less dependent on state enterprises.4' With adequate
policies, China therefore appears  to have the potential  to escape the trap of macro-instability  that has
beset other countries in the phase of reform socialism.
VII. CONCLUSIONS  AND THEIR  TRANSFERABILITY
Micro-based  evidence  on the impact  of China's reforms outside  of agriculture  has orly
recently become available, and the next few years will see an intensification  of studies in this area.
But even allowing  for data weaknesses  and gaps in information,  a number of the questions  raised in
the introduction  can be addressed.
i)  Slow versus rapid reform?  "Improving"  reforms can be successful in raising  productivity  in
agriculture and industry, more in the nonstate  sector but also in state enterprises.'  The sources of
productivity  gains in China  have gene-rally  conformed  to theoretical  predictions. Factor returns have
tended to converge  with widening  marketization,  and the entry of nonstate  enterprises  on a large scale
has helped to create domestic  competition. Flows of investment,  trading and management  skills,
notably  from the overseas Chinese community,  have complemented  the competition  benefits  of the
open door policy.  Despite incomplete  market liberalization  and reform of  property rights, incentives
in both the state and nonstate  sector have pushed  progressively  in the direction of conformity  with
market forces.
China therefore suggests  that a "Big Bang" is not necessary  for economic  reasons, unless
addressing initial macro-imbalances  justify it.  The main elements  of the "big bangs" have been price
and trade liberalization  anu supporting  fiscal, monetary and exchange  rate policies. Liberalization
was effected in China over a number  of years during which time the structure  of the economy was
able to adapt, including  through the competitive  entry of hordes of nonstate  firms.  But gradual price
45  In the early 1950s, 90 percerin  of Taiwanesc;  industry was state-owned. Through the growth of
the non-state  sector, not through privatization  of state-owned  enterprises, this share has now falien to
a small proportion.
"  It is worth recalling  that there was much criticism of TVE industry in tne 1980s  because of the
competition  it created for state enterprises, andi  that a reform strategy based on its growth by no
means seemed assured.24
liberalization  is not possible when prices are freed abruptly  at the start of the reform, as part of a
macroeconomic  stabilization  program needed as a precondition  for effective micro-level  reform.
il)  Decentralized  Initiative  In certain respects, a decentralized  "bottom-up",  approach  to reform
can have advantages. It encourages  change  by consensus  and can avoid possible costly errors.  The
most important  impact  on China's productivity  has always followed  measures  to decentralize
decisionmakihg,  in agriculture, rural and urban industry. Success on a local basis of experimentation
has spurred replication  and eventual  national  acceptance. Decentralization  has created  domestic
competition  between different provinces, regions and localities, for investment  funds, domestic
markets and foreign investments,  creating an economy of many "small provincial  dragons" and
innumerable  local "dragonlets".  Especially  for large countries like Russia and India, there are
powerful positive lessons.
On the other hand, this approach  to reform also imposes  costs:  duplication,  undue slowness,
less coherence  in national  policies, the endlessly  negotiated  "guanxi"  nature of China's economic
environment. A bottom-up  approach is quite unsuitable for certain aspects of reform, such as
establishing  the needed instruments  for macromanagement.
iii)  Property Rights at the Outset?  Immediate  privatization  may not be necessary  for successful
reform - but diversifying  ownership,  providir..g  financial  incentives  and encouraging  entry are very
important.  Much of China's gains have been due to "pseudo-privatization",  of rural land and of
rural industry, to "owners"  who, though not always private and not enjoying all of the attributes  of
ownership, have faced incentives  similar to private owners.  In addition  to the direct productivity
gains in these sectors, they have made possible the functioning  of competitive  domestic markets
exerted competitive  pressure on state enterprises, where profit-making  incentives  have been
introduced  and management  decentralized  as partial substitutes  for privatization.  China's experience
confirms that small-scale  privatization  and the liberalization  of distribution  and service sectors are
likely have the fastest payoff in the reform of property rights.
iv)  Welfare  Effects?  Growth, though necessary,  is unlikely to solve the problem of absolute
poverty alone.  After the elimination  of Stalinist repression  of -,griculture,  China's experience
suggests  that reform ieads  to a widening  of income distributioni  capable of offsetting  even the effect of25
high growth.  The early establishment  of a universal  social safety  net may be premature in many
reforming socialist  countries, but at some stage this is likely to become  one of the critical issues for
China's reform.
v)  Is Performance  Sustainable?  China's rapid growth momentum  cannot be sustained  without
deeper reforms.  It partly reflects transitional  factors and initial  conditions  that temporarily  have
boosted performance. These include the boost to agriculture  from the introduction  of the household
responsibility  system (1978-83), the initially very favorable  conditions  for the TVE sector which
resulted from surplus rural factors of production, and the extremely  repressed and in.fficient
condition  of industrial  production  at the start of the reforms.  Industry has also seen transitory
productivity  gains from the spread of marketization  which is now largely complete  outside the state
sector.
These gains from "improving"  reforms have permitted  China to move closer to its production
potential  at the same time that the potential  has grown through high investment  and technological
upgrading. In the absence  of further reforms, however, growth will slow down.  The fading of any
gains from the demographic  transition of the 1970s  is likely to strengthen  this proposit.on.
At the same time there is evidence  that some of the concerns  raised in Eastern Europe and the
FSU - such as the tendency for an economy  based on autonomous  state firms to generate persistent
excess demand - also apply  to China.  Up till now, their effect has been muted by the exceptionally
favorable growth record and unsustainably  rapid monetary deepening. In this area, China can learn
from the problems  of other countries, and it will need to look to their experience  in addressing  them.
What Kinds  of Deeper Reforms? Further reforms are needed  by both the state and the
nonstate  sector. The decline in profitability  of the former threatens to become a serious drain on the
resources of the financial  system, and thus ultimately  on the fiscal system, destabilizing  the
macroeconomy, undermining  growth, and reducing  the ability to absorb losses in a vicious  circle.
State enterprise cum banking reform has become the Gordian knot for China, just as it has for the
transforming  countries  of Eastern Europe and the FSU.  Whether  or not this necessarily  will involve
rapid, widespread,  privatization  in China is a moot point  But, to be successful, it will require26
reorganization  to have many  of the characteristics  of privatization  - including  opening  up the state
enterprise sector to foreign investment  to facilitate its integration  into world markets.
Nonstate  enterprises  have so far flourished  without  a well-developed  property rights
framework,  but there are signs that the informality  of regulation  and deep involvement  of local
gove-ments  will become a drag on performance  as firms become larger and more sophisticated  and
require longer-term  investments." Macroeconomic  management,  too, will require stable and
predictable  tax rules, rather than case-by-case  tax bargaining. This would be a further important
stage in clearly defining  the apportionment  of income, risk, and responsibility  - in short, formatly
defining  property rights.
vi)  How transferable  are lessons  from China?  Three distinctive  features of China may first be
noted.  (a)  China was never so thoroughly  a state enterprise dominated,  centrally planned,
monopolized  economy as the other, more developed  communist  countries. This left more open the
option of "growing  out of the plan" and facilitated  the growth of competition.  (b)  China started from
a rather balanced  macroeconomic  position, applied generally  conservative  macroeconomic  policies,
and was not subject to large external shocks  during reform. This differs from the situation in Europe
and the FSU, particularly after 1989. (c)  China's reforms have not been accompanied  by a
fundamental  political transition. How do these factors bear on the pattern of reform? And, what has
China done that others have not, and vice versa!
China's policies and response may be compared with twc phases of reforms in Europe and the
FSU: the pre-1990 movement  to reform socialism and the post-1990  transitions  to private market
economies. Relative  to reform socialism in Europe, China's reforms emphasized  decentralization,
stimulating  entry of new producers, permitting  domestic competition,  and opening the economy. This
in conjunction  with a highly conservative  macroeconomic  stance and the less monopolized  condition
of the economy, forced enterprises to confront  a "demand  barrier" and respond to market pressures.
At the same time, planriing  and a high degree of government  direction  were retained  in certain parts
of the economy. European reform socialism  denied new entry, developed little real competition  and
sustained  less conservative  macroeconomic  policies while abandoning  formal planning. It left agents
47  Young and Gang (1992); see also discusslon  in Byrd and Lin (1990).27
constrained  neither by market nor by plan,  In contrast, enterprises  in China were constrained  by
both, sometimes  together, with essentially  favorable results.
Relative  to post-socialist  transition. China has moved  slowly on price and market
liberalization. And with the partial exception  of agriculture, it did not effect a decisive allocation  of
property rights to private agents.
Here, the issue of political transition  becomes very important. Indeed, perhaps the most
important  lesson from China is that political economy. rather than simply  economic  theories, lies at
the heart of the process of socialist  transition.  It is most unlikely that China-style  reform would be
acceptable  - or successful - with a sharp transition away from Communist  government.  One reason
is that it leaves power and responsibility  (including  a planning  mechanism)  in the hands of the existing
bureaucracy  for an extended period. Rapid privatization  in Europe and the FSU (where political
changes preceded post-socialist  transition)  has been needed  to create alternative  owners and define
property rights in the face of governments' abdication  in these areas.  It is no accident  that the more
radical  privatization  programs have followed  the more radical breaks in the continuity  of
governments.4l
The other reason is that a gradual strategy requires effective  state management  of the
transition. Many might agree that the state could play an important  role in guiding reform in the
absence  of well-developed  market institutions.  But how to frame this role constructively  becomes  far
more .ilfficult  when the state loses capacity  to enforce its policies.  "Glasnost"  before "perestroika"
probably  dictates a quite different moeel of fast, minimally  regulated, and possibly  chaotic, reform,
for this reason alone.
This question  of whether  or not the state retains the capacity  to control bears on many
aspects of the reform process.  Take, for example,  the issue of price liberalization. From the purely
economic  perspective, the faster prices are liberalized  the better for allocative  efficiency. China chose
48  One can imagine  a China-style  reform being implemented  in the USSR in the late 1980s,  had
controls  succeeded in restoring macro-stability  and hac the government  been realiy committed  so
reform.  Communism  was externally imposed  oi) Eastern Europe however, so that it is narder to
imagine  a government retaining  iegitimacy  through an extended  reform perioa.28
gradual liberalization  because  of the potential  dislocation  and destabilization  of moving rapidly.  A
downside is that the wedge between free and controlled  prices encourages  corruption and rent-seeking
behavior. In China, the strong authority of the state has kept this within  bounds; in much of the
FSU, corruption has perhaps been the only booming  sector.  Another factor in the calculus is that
political stability is in general a correlate of high growth and foreign investment  inflows. The
political stability  maintained  in China has been an important  factor encouraging  the investment  and
growth needed to effect huge changes  smoothly.
But "perestroika"  before "glasnost"  still leaves open the large question  of whether
authoritarian  government  can coexist indefinitely  with a market economy. Experience  elsewhere in
East Asia offers a model  of gradual political  reform that ensues from economic  prosperity. Indeed,
the center and party have lost considerable  control over local economic  imitiative,  population mobility
and information  flows in China. The basic outline of economic  reform seems to be irreversible. But
there is still a possibility  of that a chaotic  political transition could damage macro stability and the
reform environment.Table  1
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Pm|  A  inmwr  1978-79  22%  rie  in agricultural  I  - TP  et  199092  Rd  n  d  y
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TABLE  2
Selected  Economic  Indlcators
00Av  70  A  80D  Av  1990 91-
Level  of  Per  Capita  GNP  (PPP  in 85  conabnt  dollare)
China  647  1004  1712  nla
EastAsia  1084  1946  3122  nia
Socialist  Comparators  2165  3800  4559  nla
India  613  642  687  noa
Rat!o  of  PPPIAtlas  Per  Capita  GNP  (in 8E  constant  drollare
China  9.41  8.94  8.86  nla
East  Asia  2.81  2.77  2.80  nla
Socialist  Comparators  5.29  3.97  3.99  noa
India  3.22  3.00  2.68  nla
Growth  Rate  of Per  Capita  GNP  (Atlas  in 85  constant  dollars)
China  1.21  5.53  7.62  4Vm
East  Asia  4.87  6.42  Rf67  5.16
Socialist  Comparators  5.70  5.09  0.59  .8.60
India  1.47  0.73  3.50  1.54
lavesunt  Ratio
China  0.21  0.30  0.35  0.36
East  Asia  0.18  0.26  0.27  0.34
Socialist  Comparators  0.30  Ihy  0.34  WY)  0.31  0.23  (hp
India  0.16  0.20  0.23  0.22
Efficiency  OOCR)  S
China  0.16  0.25  0.26  0.12
East  Asia  0.44  0.33  0.27  0.24
Socialist  Comparators  nla  0.17  0.06  -0.34
India  0.23  0.16  0.26  0.25
Growth  of  Expor.
China  1.98  5.69  14.49  9.87
East  Asia  15,30  18.05  9.48  10.73
Socialist  Comparators  nla  6.70  ,hpyl  2.70  lhpyl  5.39  pIP
India  2.27  7.97  6.42  n/a
INFLATIONGN
China  1.08  0;75  8.15  1.29
East  Asia  29.82  12.42  7.12  6.79
Socialist  Comparators  12.51  IY)  6.79  64.39  180.07
India  6.03  7.54  9.12  11.42
M21GDP
China  nla  0.28  0.55  0.89
East  Asia  0.20  0.34  0.54  0.79
Socialist  Comparators  0.51  ,yj  0.64  (y)  0.54  lhpy,  0.37  hpy
India  0.22  0.29  0.42  0.46
Note.
East  Asia  represented  by  Indonesia,  Korea,  Taiwan  and  Thailand.
Socialist  Comparators  are  Hungary,  Poland,  Former  USSR  and  Yugoslavia.
Data  not  available  for  1991  in  some  cases.
e  IOCR  - GOP  Growth  Rate/Investment  Rate
(hpl  Average  of  Hungary  and  Poland.
(h9y) Average  of  Hungary,  Poland  and  Yugoslavia.
jhy)  Average  of  Hungary  and  Yugoslavia  only.
vyj  Average  for  Yugoslavia  only.
(p)  Average  for  Poland  only.
uA  Inflation  computed  from  CPI.
Source:  World  Bank  for  most  of  the  variables.  PPP  values  taken  from  Summers  and  Heston,  1991,
The  Penn  World  Table  (Mark  5):  An  Expanded  Set  of  International  Comparisons,  1950.1988,
The  Ouorterly  Journal  of  Economnics  pp  327-368.- 33  -
TASLE3
Selected  Social  Indicators
lOsAvi  70o  Avin  S  Ava  1990.91'
Life  Expoctanoy
Chhn  52.60  64.37  68.58  70.28
Eagt  Asia  55.62  61.25  65.82  68.13
Socialist  Comparators  66.20  69.32  69.98  71.39
India  44.87  50.12  56.36  59.21
Inhfnt  Mortalitv  Rate
China  105.30  51.00  35.59  2888
East  Asia  n/a  69.78  rkt)  48  .06 kt)  35,18  Okit
Socialist  Comparators  46.55  30.66  22.72  17.00
India  nla  130.14  104.43  91.90
Am  Daendancy  Ratio  [-(under  15  and  over  8411(15  84)1
Chins  0.79  0.76  0.57  0.49
East  Asia  0.87  0.77  0.63  0.54
Socialist  Comparators  0.57  0.52  0.52  0.51
India  0.78  0.77  0.72  0.70
Women's  Particibation  in  Labor  Force  l- (Female  laborlOO)Fama PoPubltion]
China  44.19  44.52  48.46  52.20
East  Asia  29.12  k)  30  58  ,)  32.36  z,t  33 17  W
Socialist  Comparators  38.33  41.01  42.22  42.35
India  28.41  24.98  22.01  20.95
Grco  Enrollment  Ratio:  Secondary
China  nla  24.00  50.38  40.50
East  Asia  nla  22 67 wt,  42.81  t)  54.33  l
Socialist  Comparators  n/a  69.77  jy  ,  80.08  82.25
India  nWa  26.  50  31.00  38.50
Gross  Enrollment  Ratio.  Females:  Primary
China  n/a  113.67  113.10  nla
East  Asia  77.33  91.50  103.96  99.00  ht)
Socialist  Comparators  102.88  98.29  100.02  n/a
India  48.50  61.83  76.20  nla
Notes
East  Asia  represented  by  Indonesia,  Korea,  Taiwan  and  Thailand.
Socialist  Comparators  are  Hungary,  Poland,  Former  USSR  and  Yugoslavia.
)kt)  Average  of Indonesia,  Korea  and  Thailand.
ktj  Average  of  Korea  and  Thailand  only.
zp.r Average  of  Indonesia,  Korea  and  Thailand.
Gross  enrollment  ratio  is  defined  as  gross  enrollment  (in  all  streams)  of  all ages
at  the  primary/secondary/tertiary  level  as  a  percentage  of  school-age  population
as  defined  by  each  country  and  reported  to Unesco.  Many  countries  consiaer
primary  school  age  to  be  6.11  years  and  secondary  to  be  12.17  years.  This  ratio  may  be
greater  than  100%  if some  pupils  are  outside  the  country's  standard  age-range.
Source:  United  Nations  Social  Indicators  Database.- 34  -
Table 4:
Sources of Growth
Growth rate  Contribution  Contribution  Contribution
of net mat'1  of increase  of increase  of TFP growth
product  in K  stock  in L force
(1980  prices)
(y)  (aKk)  (aLl)  (tfp)
1955-65  4.31  1.50  5.79  -2.98
1965-78  6.40  1.55  3.64  1.20
1978-84  7.98  1.83  3.31  2.84
1984-88  10.12  1.80  4.51  3.82
1988-91  5.30  1.43  4.37  -0.50
These figures are derived from an aggregate production function converted into
the standard growth accounting form:
y  tfp +  aKk +  aLl.
Data sources: SSB (1991)  p. 401, SSB  (1992),  pp. 33, 97, 401, 406-7, 413
Table  5:
Sectoral  Sharee  of  China's  Gross  Social  Product*
1952  1978  1984  1990
Agriculture  45.4  20.4  24.4  20.2
(28.4)  (33.0)  (28.4)
Industry  34.4  61.9  57.8  63.0
(44.8)  (40.1)  (39.5)
of  which:
state-owned  41.5  77.6  69.1  54.6
collective  3.3  22.4  29.7  35.6
other  55.2a  C.0  1.2  9.8
Services and  14.6  9.4  8.2  9.0
transportation  (23.0)  (21.9)  (27.2)
a.  Pre-nationalization.
*  The figures not in parentheses represent Social Gross Product, i.e. they
are inclusive of intermediate inputs at the level of the producer.  The
figures in parentheses are shares based on GNP which are exclusive of
intermediate inputs.  Also note: industry includes construction.
Data sources: SSB  (1991),  pp. 31, 50, 396- 35 -
Table 6:
Sectoral Sources of Growth. 1962-1988




TFP  -0.6 (0.8)1  0.e03
1965-78
total  2.9
TFP  -1.0 (0.9)
1978-84
total  8.0  (8.49)  (14.03)
TFP  5.9 (6.2)2  5.2 (1.80)4  (3.45)
1984-88
total  4.0  (10.22)  (19.86)
TFP  (3.0)  (3.01)  (5.86)
1. Figurea for labor productivity  (in  parentheses) and TFP for 1955-65 and
1965-78 are drawn from A. Tang  (1981) "Chinese  Agriculture: Its Problems and
Prospects," Working Paper No. 82-WO9, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt
University.
2. TFP and labor productivity figures drawn from McMillan et al  (1989).
3. For the period 1953-78.
4. The figures in parentheses are TFP measures for capital, labor  and
intermediate inputs.  The earlier figures cover 1980-84, not 1978-84.
Table 7:
Levels of TFP in State and Collective Industrv
State industry  Collective industry
1980  2.18  2.28
1984  2.34  2.64
1988  2.63  3.04
Index for 1988
(1980 =  100)  120.6  133.3
Source: Jefferson and Rawski, 1992 (p.  52)- 36 -
Table  8:
Comrparative Levels  of Industrial  TFP  Growth
Country  Period  Estimate
Chinal  1957-78  (SOE)  0.4
1978-85  (SOE)  4.8
China:  1980-88  (SOE)  2.4
1980-88  (COE)  4.6
Hong  Kong  1960-70  3.2
Singapore  !960-70  3.6
Taiwan  i955-70  5.4
Korea  1960-70  3.7
1960-77  3.7
Turkey  1963-76  1.3
Yugoslavia  1965-78  0.5
India  1959-79  -0.3
Source:
1. Chen  et al  (1988).
2. JRZ  (1992).
All  other  figures  are  from  I.J.  Ahluw]ia  (1991).
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Figure  3 continued
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Distributional  Indicators
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